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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(2)0) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The following issues are presented for review: 
(1) Whether the Objection filed by Harrington Trucking on April 7,1998, constituted 
an answer to Appellee Janet Robins' Petition. This is a question of law, with no deference 
being granted to the trial court's decision. Klinger v. Knightly, 791 P.2d 868 (Utah 1990). 
(2) Whether Appellant Harrington Trucking, Inc. filed an answer by October 22, 
1998, as directed by the trial court. This is a question of fact, requiring Appellant to 
marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's finding. A finding of fact based on 
documentary evidence is not set aside unless it is clearly erroneous. Consolidation Coal Co. 
v. Utah Div. of State Lands and Forestry, 886 P.2d 514 (Utah 1994). 
(3) Whether the trial court abused its discretion when on December 16, 1998, it 
refused to set aside Harrington Trucking's default, even though Harrington never contested 
any of the allegations of Janet Robin's Petition, the time for trial had passed, and Janet's 
cause of action would be completely foreclosed to her if it not adjudicated before December 
29,1999. This issue is reviewed on an abuse of discretion standard, under which the Court 
1 
of Appeals will reverse only if there has been abuse of discretion. Birch v. Birch, 111 P.2d 
1114 (Utah Ct.App. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case: 
This case began on December 29, 1997, when Harrington's semi tractor-trailer lost 
control on an icy 1-15, crossed the median and killed Dennis Mitchell. Dennis was Janet 
Robins' common law husband; they had lived together since 1987. To have her marriage 
validated, Janet filed her Verified Petition for Declaration of Common Law Marriage as 
required by Utah statute.1 Under statute, Janet's Petition had to be completely adjudicated 
within one year from the date the relationship ended. If it were not, the trial court would lose 
jurisdiction and Janet could never have her marriage declared valid. 
All Dennis Mitchell's known heirs supported Janet's Petition, so they never filed 
answers in opposition to it. Seeking to limit its liability, however, Harrington Trucking 
moved to intervene. Janet objected to intervention because, among other things, Harrington 
had filed no answer or any pleading setting forth its claims or defenses. Time was critical 
because Janet had only had a short time for judicial validation of her marriage. Harrington 
had admitted on several occasions that it didn't file an answer. Initially, it argued it didn't 
have to file an answer and that it needed to conduct discovery so it could file one. The trial 
1
 "Common law" is perhaps somewhat a misnomer, as Utah has enacted statutory provision for 
validating unsolemnized marriages. Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 (1995). 
2 
court allowed Harrington's intervention, giving it some time for discovery so it could frame 
an answer. The court also imposed a deadline for Harrington to file the answer if it chose 
to contest Janet's Petition. Harrington did not file by the court-imposed deadline and so 
default was entered. Admitting that it had not filed an answer as ordered, Harrington moved 
to set aside the default based on excusable neglect. At that same time, Harrington late-filed 
an answer. 
Harrington then filed a reply memorandum supporting its motion to Set Aside. There, 
for the first time, Harrington argued that its "Objection," which was part of its motion to 
intervene, was actually a timely answer. It contended this even though that Objection 
disputed none of the Petition's allegations and the trial court had directed Harrington to file 
an answer when its motion to intervene and that Objection were before the court. Although 
Harrington's motion to set aside was timely under Rule 60(b), it scheduled the motion 
hearing to fall only seven working days before Janet's case would expire. The trial court 
rejected Harrington's arguments and its motion to set aside was denied. Harrington appeals 
that denial; it does not appeal the judgment itself. 
B. Course of the Proceedings: 
Janet filed her Petition on February 17, 1998. It was unopposed. But on March 24, 
1998, Harrington Trucking filed its motion to intervene, to which Janet objected. On April 
7,1998, Harrington filed a reply memorandum and its Objection to Petition for Declaration 
of Common Law Marriage ("Objection"). At the September 18, 1998, hearing on those 
3 
matters, Harrington acknowledged that it had not filed an answer. In light of the short time 
frame, the trial court allowed Harrington's intervention and gave it until October 19, 1998, 
to conduct discovery so it could determine a factual basis to contest Janet's Petition, if any. 
The trial court also explicitly directed Harrington to file an answer by October 22, 1998, if 
it was going to file one. Trial was set for November 12, 1998. 
Harrington conducted no formal discovery in this case and allowed the October 22nd 
deadline to pass without filing anything further. On October 28, 1998, default was entered. 
Harrington timely moved to set default aside under Rule 60(b). Its supporting memorandum 
acknowledged that it had not filed an answer as directed, but it contended this failure was 
excusable neglect. That having been done, however, Harrington set the hearing date for 
December 16, 1998 - just 12 calendar days and seven working days before Janet's time 
would run out. On November 10, 1998, Harrington filed a reply memorandum supporting 
its motion to set aside, where it first contended its April 7 * Objection to Janet's Petition was 
actually an answer. Hearing on Harrington's motion to set aside was held on December 16, 
1998. 
C. Disposition at Trial Court: 
At the December 16th hearing, Judge Maughan, sitting for Judge Stirba, informed 
counsel that he had read the whole case file. Harrington contended the April 7 * Objection 
was actually an answer and its neglect excusable and Judge Maughan heard those 
contentions. He focused, however, on Judge Stirba's clear order giving Harrington until 
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October 22nd to file a real answer and that Harrington knew it could not rely on the 
Objection as an answer. He then focused on the prejudice to Janet that would result if the 
default was set aside at such a late date because it would be impossible to try the case before 
the statutory time expired. Accordingly, he denied Harrington's Motion to Set Aside. Given 
the timing, it was clear that someone was not going to get a trial on the merits - the only 
question was whether it should be Janet or Harrington. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. This case arises out of the "common law" marital relationship between Janet 
Robins and Dennis Mitchell which commenced on or about April 28, 1987. (R. 1-4.) 
2. That marital relationship abruptly terminated on December 29, 1997, when 
Harrington's northbound semi tractor-trailer lost control on 1-15, crossed the median and 
struck the southbound pickup in which the Mitchells were traveling. Janet was seriously 
injured, but Dennis Mitchell was killed outright. (R. 2,48, 71.) 
3. On February 17, 1998, Janet Robins filed her petition seeking a judicial 
declaration validating her marriage pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §30-1-4.5 (1995). (R.l-28.) 
4. When the action was filed, all the known heirs of Dennis Mitchell filed 
affidavits in support of Janet's Petition, affirming their knowledge of the common law 
marital relationship and supporting Janet's action to validate the marriage. (R. 5 - 28.) 
Thus, no answer controverting the allegations of Janet's Petition was ever filed. (See Index 
to Record on Appeal.) 
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5. Harrington Trucking sought to intervene without filing an answer on the basis 
that they had not yet conducted discovery and, thus, had no basis to deny the Petition's 
allegations. (R. 38-40.) 
6. Harrington had filed no proposed answer or supporting memorandum. 
Therefore, Janet objected to intervention under Utah R. Civ. P. 24(c) and UCJA 4-501, on 
the basis that Harrington had failed to file a memorandum or any pleading setting forth its 
claims or defenses. Without this, Janet would unfairly be required to go to trial without 
knowing which of her allegations, if any, were contested. (R. 51.) 
7. Then on April 7, 1998 Harrington filed two pleadings: (1) Harrington 
Trucking's Objection to Petition for Judicial Declaration of Common Law Marriage (the 
"Objection" or "Harrington's Objection"); and (2) Harrington Trucking's Reply 
Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Intervene ("Intervention Memorandum"). (R.58-
90.) 
8. The Intervention Memorandum stated that the nature of a petition for 
declaration of common law marriage precluded an answer being filed. (R. 64-65.) It also 
stated "to the extent [the trial] court may determine an additional pleading is required" 
Harrington was filing [Harrington's Objection] with the reply memorandum. (R. 65.) 
9. The text of Harrington's Obj ection states: 
The basis for this objection is found in the motion to intervene and the accompanying 
memoranda filed by movant Harrington Trucking and upon the basis that the facts 
and affidavits submitted by petitioner are insufficient to satisfy the requirements of 
Utah Code Ann. §30-1-4.5 
6 
(Harrington Trucking's Objection to Petitioner for Judicial Declaration of Common Law 
Marriage, R. 55, 88.) A copy of Harrington's Objection and Intervention Memorandum is 
appended as Appendix A. 
10. Neither the Intervention Memorandum nor the Objection contest any 
allegation of Janet's Petition. {See R. 55 - 68.) 
11. All parties, including Harrington Trucking, were aware that Utah Code Ann. 
§30-1-4.5(2) (1995) required that adjudication of a common law marriage must be entered 
within one year of its termination or it could not be entered at all. {Bunch v. Englehorn, 906 
P.2d 918 (Utah App. 1995); see R. 295, Tr. Hearing 9/18/98 pp. 10, 11.) 
The First Hearing. September 18. 1998 
12. Against this background, at the hearing on September 18, 1998, Janet argued 
that there was no answer on file and no claims at issue. Janet's counsel asked "[w]hat's the 
claim or what's the defense . . . it just doesn't appear anywhere." (R. 295, Tr. Hearing 
9/18/98 p. 3,11. 1-5.) Again, following Judge Stirba's decision to allow intervention, the 
subject of not knowing which allegations were contested came up in the context of the 
shortened time for adjudication under the statute. (R. 295, Tr. Hearing 9/18/98 pp. 10-11.) 
13. If Harrington did not intervene, there was no party adverse to Janet's Petition. 
(R. 295, Tr. Hearing 9/18/98 p. 5 11. 20 -22.) 
14. At the hearing, Harrington never contended the Objection was an answer, but 
rather argued that it needed to intervene because it "want[ed] the opportunity to explore 
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through discovery, whether or not there are valid grounds for the claim in the petition of 
common law marriage." (R. 295, Tr. Hearing 9/18/98 p. 9.11. 21 - 23.) 
15. Judge Stirba granted Harrington's intervention, allowing it until October 19, 
1998, for discovery and until October 22, 1998, to file an answer - if it then chose to - even 
though that would leave Janet very little time to prepare for trial. The trial court stated: 
Under the circumstances, it seems to me that 30 days is sufficient for 
discovery as to the issue common law marriage. You'll [Harrington will] 
have to make this a high priority.... And then — and then there must — at 
that point, I would say an answer to the petition if one is intended to be filed 
should be filed on or before the 22nd of October so you know exactly what 
any claims are. 
(R. 295, Tr. Hearing 9/18/99 pp. 15,11. 24-25; 16,11. 1-6 (emphasis added).) 
16. The trial court further instructed the parties that time would not allow for 
continuance or delay, stating "[d]on't ask for a continuance on this, you need to get done 
what you need to do in that time frame." (R. 295, Tr. Hearing 9/18/98 p. 18 11. 2-4.) 
The Default and Second Hearing of December 16. 1998 
17. When no answer had been filed by the October 22nd court-imposed deadline, 
Janet took judgment by default. (R. 135-137.) Harrington moved to set aside the default 
on the grounds of excusable neglect under Rule 60(b). (R. 123-124.) 
18. Contemporaneously with its October 28, 1998 Motion to Set Aside, 
Harrington filed an untimely answer. (Answer to Verified Petition for Judicial Declaration 
of Common Law Marriage, R. 129 - 131.) A copy of Harrington's Answer is appended 
hereto as Appendix B. 
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19. In its Memorandum in Support of Motion to Set Aside Any Default Judgment 
or Declaration of Common Law Marriage Entered in This Case ("Supporting 
Memorandum"), Harrington again acknowledged that it "inadvertently failed to file an 
answer by October 22nd as required by this court's September 18, 1998 Order." (R. 126.) 
20. In its Supporting Memorandum, Harrington further argued that no prejudice 
would result to any party if it were allowed to late file its answer. (R. 127.) 
21. The first claim that Harrington makes that it filed a timely answer is found in 
its Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment or Declaration 
of Common Law Marriage ("Reply Memorandum"), dated November 10, 1998. (R. 160-
235.) 
22. There Harrington claims its April 7th Objection "was our answer and functions 
as an answer to Ms. Robins Petition." (R. 161.) 
23. Even though earlier dates were available, Harrington scheduled its Motion to 
Set Aside for hearing on December 16, 1998. (R. 238.) This was 12 calendar days and only 
seven working days before Janet's case would expire by statute. 
24. On December 16, 1998, Commissioner Arnett recommended approval of 
Harrington's Motion to Set Aside, which was immediately objected to by Janet. Hearing on 
that objection was held before the Honorable Paul G. Maughan, who overturned 
Commissioner Arnett's recommendation on that same day. (R. 238-241; see R. 294, Tr. 
Hearing 12/16/98 (Hearing on Petitioner's Objection to Commissioner's Recommendation.)) 
9 
A copy of that Order is attached a s Appendix C. 
25. Harrington does not argue that the lower court's finding of prejudice to Janet 
was in error. See Appellant's Brief. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Harrington's three arguments all contend the trial court erred in not setting aside the 
default because it had already filed an answer in the form of Harrington's Objection dated 
April 7, 1998. (Appellant's brief p. 6 - 13.) Those arguments all fail simply because that 
Objection is not an answer. An answer sets forth the grounds for defense and places at issue 
some or all of the allegations of the petition. The Objection filed by Harrington denies none 
of the Petition's allegations. It merely demurred to the Petition similar to a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion. Moreover, the trial court, Janet, and even Harrington knew the Objection was not 
an answer. Only at the last minute, when it realized its delay strategy would not work did 
Harrington raise the spurious argument that its Objection was really an answer. 
Even if the Objection were an answer, it contested none of the Petition's allegations 
and so they are deemed admitted. Therefore, the only issue before the trial court was 
whether the Petition was sufficient to state Janet's cause of action. The trial court reviewed 
it, found the Petition sufficient and judgment was proper. Harrington, however, does not 
attack that determination, for it has not appealed the judgment itself. Thus, setting aside its 
default is meaningless- its "answer" defaulted it by not contesting the Petition's allegations 
Harrington cannot now argue the trial court should have set aside its default based 
10 
on "clerical error" under Rule 60(a) for several reasons. Whether an answer was on filed 
is a factual matter, not a clerical matter. There were implicit and explicit factual findings 
that no answer was on file. Thus, Harrington is required to marshal the evidence supporting 
this factual finding if it seeks to attack it. Harrington has not done so. Moreover, 
Harrington never asked the Court below for relief under Rule 60(a). That argument cannot 
be raised for the first time here on appeal. 
The trial court also correctly rejected Harrington's excusable neglect argument under 
Rule 60(b). It has never shown what its meritorious defense is. Indeed, it is not raised in 
its Objection, which it now claims is its answer. While policy favors allowing litigants their 
day in court, setting aside the default would have heaped insurmountable prejudice on Janet. 
It would have effectively denied Janet her day in court, which is contrary to the policy -
especially where it was Harrington, not Janet, that was at fault. 
Harrington concedes this insurmountable prejudice to Janet. It neither addresses the 
issue in its brief, nor does it marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's factual 
finding that prejudice would result to Janet. The trial court properly found that the prejudice 
far outweighed allowing Harrington its day in court. 
Although Harrington has put a lot of smoke in its bottle, the issues before the Court 
can be resolved by resort to two fairly basic legal concepts. The first is, what is an answer? 
The second is how does a court determine when neglect is excusable? 
11 
ARGUMENT 
I. Harrington's Objection of April 7,1998 Was Not an Answer. 
Harrington's Objection is not an answer. See R. 55 - 68. An answer is defined as: 
a pleading by which defendant endeavors to resist the plaintiffs demand by an 
allegation of facts, either denying allegations of plaintiff's complaint or 
confessing them and alleging new matter in avoidance, which defendant 
alleges should prevent recovery on facts alleged by plaintiff... the answer is 
the formal written statement made by a defendant setting forth the grounds of 
his defense; corresponding to what in actions under the common law practice 
is called the "plea." 
Black's Law Dictionary - 5th Ed. (1981) (emphasis added). Answers are governed by Utah 
R. Civ. P. 8(b). Whether one is a defendant or an intervenor, some allegation of the petition 
or complaint must be denied in order to have an actual controversy for the court to decide. 
The trial court recognized this fact, when it noted that even though Harrington sought to 
intervene, no one had yet contested Janet's Petition. R. 295, Tr. Hearing 9/18/98 p. 5,1.1. 
20 - 22. 
Once Judge Stirba granted Harrington's motion to intervene, Harrington became a 
party subject to filing an answer under Rule 8(b) if it were going to factually contest the 
Petition. That is what the court ordered on September 18,1998. See Provo City v. Hansen, 
601 P.2d 141 (Utah 1979) (after various motions were made, the court ruled that applicants 
for intervention could intervene and file their answers). But an answer requires that 
Harrington to set forth some factual matter at issue. See Has lam v. Has lam, 19 Utah 1, 56 
12 
P. 243 (1899) (an answer denying a material allegation of a plaintiff s complaint will raise 
an issue between the parties). Otherwise, all the trial court is faced with is determining 
whether the uncontroverted allegations of the petition are legally sufficient. Stevens v. 
Collard, 837 P.2d. 593 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), modified on other grounds, 863 P.2d 534 
(Utah Ct.App. 1993). 
Utah case law on exactly what constitutes and answer is sparse - perhaps because it 
is so elemental. But see Haslam v. Haslam, supra. Federal practice properly offers 
guidance, because Rule 8(b) of the Utah and Federal rules virtually identical. Compare Utah 
R. Civ. P. 8(b) with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b). This Court can properly "look to the abundant 
federal experience in the area for guidance." Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127, 
1130 (Utah 1990). Federal Practice and Procedure explains the concept and content of an 
answer this way: 
Rule 8(b) FRCP is intended to inform a pleader how to challenge and place in 
issue some or all of the allegations in the preceding pleading. The provision 
directs the author of a responsive pleading whether it be an answer or a reply, 
to state in short and plain terms his defenses to each claim asserted against him 
and to admit or deny the averments upon which the adverse party relies. . . . 
A failure to deny an allegation when a responsive pleading is required 
results in it being admitted according to Rule 8(d). The theory of Rules 8(b) 
and 8(d) is that a defendant's pleading should apprise the opponent of the 
allegations in the complaint that stand admitted and will not be in issue at 
trial and those that are contested and will require proof to be established to 
enable plaintiff to prevail. The pleading of affirmative defenses, as opposed 
to denials, is governed by Rule 8(c) 
If an answer is not sufficiently definite in nature to give reasonable 
notice of the allegations in the complaint sought to be placed in issue, the 
averments may be treated as admitted. 
13 
Charles Wright and Arthur Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1261 (1990 ed.) 
(emphases added). 
Thus, Harrington's characterization of its Objection as an answer is hard to fathom. 
The text of the Objection stated that the: 
basis for this objection is found in the motion to intervene and the accompanying 
memoranda filed by movant Harrington Trucking and upon the basis that the facts 
and affidavits submitted by petitioner are insufficient to satisfy the requirements of 
Utah Code Ann. §30-1-4.5 
R. 55, Appendix A (emphasis added). However, neither it nor the pleadings it refers to deny 
or controvert a single allegation of the Petition.2 It merely states that the allegations are 
insufficient to make a case for declaration of valid marriage under the statute. Indeed the 
Intervention Memorandum filed with the Objection says it will not address the elemental 
allegations of the Petition. It states "Harrington Trucking's right to intervene is determined 
by examining the effect of this determination, not the elements giving rise to it." R. 61. In 
other words, Harrington was expressly not addressing the allegations of the Petition. But, 
Utah courts have recognized for a century that an answer must at a minimum deny some 
material allegation of the complaint or petition to create an issue. Haslam v. Haslam, 19 
Utah 1, 56 P. 243 (1899). Its bald assertions aside, Harrington's Objection is not an answer 
to Janet's Petition. Id; Utah R. Civ. P. 8(b). 
2Admittedly, the memorandum makes a strong case for allowing intervention. That, however, is not 
the same as contesting the Petition's allegations. 
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Since the Objection was never an answer, the trial court properly ordered Harrington 
to file one if it was going to contest Janet's Petition. Harrington knew no proper answer was 
on file. Indeed, the trial court had the Objection before it when it ordered Harrington to 
answer by October 22, 1998. Janet's counsel repeatedly asked what Harrington's claims 
were. Harrington itself represented to the trial court that it was not responding to the 
"elements giving rise to" Janet's claim and that no answer could be filed. R. 61, 64-65. 
Harrington did not file an answer and, accordingly, the trial court correctly entered default 
and later correctly refused to set that default aside. 
II. Even if Harrington's Objection Were Considered an Answer, Default 
Was Proper. 
This court may affirm the trial court's ruling on any proper grounds, whether relied 
on by the trial court or not. DeBry v. Noble 889 P.2d 428,444, (Utah 1995). Thus, another 
way to view this case is to look at what follows if Harrington's Objection is treated as its 
answer. If so, there would be only one legal issue because Harrington's Objection denies 
none of the factual allegations. Utah R. Civ. P. 8(d). That issue is: with its allegations taken 
as true, does the Petition meet the statutory requirements? The Objection, and the pleadings 
it refers to, do not suggest why Janet's petition is insufficient to satisfy the requirements of 
Utah Code Ann. §30-1-4.5. The Objection simply says the Petition does not satisfy the 
statute. At best it is a bare Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 
But, in rendering a default the trial court must first conclude the allegations of the 
petition are legally sufficient. Stevens v. Collard, 837 P.2d 593 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), 
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modified on other grounds 863 P.2d. 534 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). There is nothing in the 
record to indicate the trial court shirked that duty. And, in fact, a review of the Petition 
shows it is sufficient on its face. See R. 1-28. Thus, the trial court properly entered default 
judgment and, just as properly, refused to set it aside. The Petition was sufficient and 
Harrington's Objection put no facts in issue. 
Furthermore, Harrington never moved for dismissal below under Utah R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6). Nor has it appealed the judgment itself. It chose not to, but rather sought to set 
aside the default under Rule 60 (b).3 Therefore, any claim that the Petition was legally 
deficient has been laid to rest and Harrington, having been dilatory, having failed to contest 
any of the allegations, and having failed to appeal the judgment itself, should not be allowed 
to use this "side door" to foreclose Janet's cause of action. 
III. Harrington Concedes Setting Aside the Default Would Prejudice Janet 
and the Trial Court Properly Balanced That Prejudice With Policy 
Favoring Trial on The Merits. 
Harrington originally argued that the trial court should have set aside its default under 
Rule 60(b), an argument it renews on appeal. Like ignoring the 500 lb. gorilla in the room, 
however, Harrington has never argued that setting aside the default would not unduly 
prejudice Janet. Therefore, its Rule 60(b) argument must fail. 
Our Supreme Court has adopted a four part test to determine when neglect is 
3
 An argument can be constructed that Harrington consciously chose not to appeal 
because that was more likely to toll the one year adjudication window created by the statute whereas 
the application to set aside the default would not have the same tolling effect. Perhaps it is paranoia, 
but the question remains. 
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excusable: 
"[i] the danger of prejudice to [the nonmoving party], [ii] the length of the delay and 
its potential impact on judicial proceedings, [iii] the reason for the delay, including 
whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and [iv] whether the 
movant acted in good faith.1' 
West v. Grand County, 942 P.2d 337, 340-341 (Utah 1997) (bracketing included), quoting 
City ofChanute v. Williams Natural Gas Co., 31 F.3d 1041, 1046 (10th Cir.l994)(quoting 
Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 395, 113 S.Ct. at 1498), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 1191, 115 S.Ct. 1254, 
131 L.Ed.2d 135 (1995)). This Court has applied similar factors in the context of dismissals 
for failure to prosecute the Court considers to determine whether neglect is excusable. 
Those factors are: 
(1) the conduct of both parties; (2) the opportunity each party has had to 
move the case forward; (3) what each party has done to move the case 
forward; (4) the amount of difficulty or prejudice that may have been caused 
to the other side; and (5) most important, whether injustice may result from 
the dismissal. 
Meadow Fresh Farms, Inc. v. Utah State University Dept. of Agriculture and Applied 
Science, 813 P.2d 1216, 1219 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (citation omitted, emphases added). 
Thus, prejudice to the nonmoving party and the parties' respective conduct are recurring 
themes. 
It is clear from the record that inter alia Judge Maughan refused to grant Harrington's 
motion because to do so would irreparably prejudice Janet, who had done nothing wrong. 
(See argument regarding lack of meritorious defense below.) Moreover, he made a factual 
finding that the trial court's schedule and that of counsel made it impossible to try the case 
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within the one year time required by statute without prejudicing the petitioner and creating 
undue hardship. R. 255; R. 294, Tr. Hearing 12/16/98 p. 29. To challenge that factual 
finding of the trial court on appeal, Harrington must marshal all the evidence supporting the 
trial court's fact finding and then demonstrate why the finding is in error. This Court has 
put it thus: 
To successfully challenge a trial court's findings of fact on appeal, "[a]n 
appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then 
demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking 
in support as to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them 
'clearly erroneous.'" 
Campbell v. Box Elder Co., 962 P. 2d 806, 808 (Ut. Ct. App. 1998) quoting Valcarce v. 
Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1997). Harrington has not marshaled any evidence 
regarding the prejudice to Janet. 
Harrington does not dispute this factual finding, hoping that (like the gorilla) it will 
go away. But without addressing it, it cannot show how its neglect can be excused, which 
is its burden. It has not marshaled any evidence as it is required to do. The trial court's 
finding of prejudice to Janet is adequately supported in the record. Having failed to properly 
dispute the finding of prejudice, Harrington cannot show the trial court's refusal to set aside 
the default was an abuse of discretion. 
Moreover, Judge Maughan properly balanced this prejudice against the policy 
favoring trial on the merits, finding that the prejudice to Janet outweighed that policy. In 
fact, under the unusual circumstances of this case, that policy supported denial of 
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Harrington's Motion to Set Aside. Had the motion to set aside been granted on December 
16, 1998, the court likely could not try the matter by December 28, 1998.4 Accordingly, 
there could be no trial on the merits for Janet, who had done nothing wrong. She would 
never get her day in court although it was Harrington's neglect that created the delay. That 
is not excusable neglect on Harrington's part. West v. Grand County, 942 P.2d at 340-341 
(Utah 1997); Meadow Fresh Farms, 813 P.2d at 1219 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Such a result 
is unconscionable and the trial court knew it. In short, because of Harrington's neglect, 
someone was not going to get their day in court and the trial court determined it should be 
Harrington rather than Janet. 
Moreover, Harrington fails (still) to set forth any meritorious defense, which is 
required to set aside default under Rule 60(b). Erickson v. Schenkers International 
Forwarders, Inc., 882 P.2d 1147 (Utah 1994). It claims it has one and directs this Court 
to "subpoenas and other records which indicate there is a meritorious defense." Appellant's 
Brief p. 16; see R. 68 - 90 (the "subpoenas and other records"). But subpoenas and records 
do not a meritorious defense make. Perhaps Janet's counsel are slow, but they have not 
divined what it is. And although it is Harrington's burden to show it, Harrington holds its 
nature close to it breast. It never tells the trial court or this Court what it is and review of 
the record does not disclose a meritorious defense either. R. 68-90. 
4Even had the Court been able to try the matter by then, Janet would nonetheless been 
prejudiced. Only seven working days remained at that point, one of which was Christmas Eve. 
Many witnesses were likely unavailable and her counsel had other matters pending. 
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Finally, Harrington chose the timing and one has to question whether it "timely" 
pursued its remedy. Admittedly, Harrington timely filed its motion to set aside its default 
on October 28,1998. But having done so, it did not seek an expedited resolution. And why 
should it? Counsel for Harrington conceded that he scheduled the hearing on that motion 
just 12 days before the adjudication deadline, even though earlier hearing dates were 
available. R. 294, Tr. 12/16/98 Hearing pp. 19-20. That did not increase the "excusability" 
of Harrington's neglect. 
IV. Harrington Has Failed to Marshall The Evidence to Attack the Court's 
Factual Finding That No Answer Was Filed. 
The trial court found on three occasions that there was no answer file, which is an 
issue of fact. Although Harrington bases all three of its arguments on the factual assertion 
that it had actually filed an answer, it devotes a mere three lines to the factual part of that 
claim. Those three lines simply recite that Harrington also filed a separate objection or 
"answer" on April 7, 1998.5 Appellant's Brief p. 4. To challenge a factual finding of the 
trial court on appeal, one must marshal all the evidence supporting the trial court's fact 
finding and then demonstrate why the finding is in error. See Campbell v. Box Elder Co,, 
962 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) supra (allocating burden to appellants to marshal 
evidence supporting a factual finding if attacking it on appeal). Harrington has wholly 
failed to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's finding that there was no answer. 
5Whether that objection constituted an "answer" is a question law, dealt with previously. 
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The trial court made findings that no answer was on file, not once, but three times. 
The first occurred implicitly at hearing on September 18, 1998 when Judge Stirba ordered 
that an answer be filed by October 22 nd if one was going to be filed; The second when 
default entered on October 28,1998; And the third when Harrrington's Motion to Set Aside 
was heard on December 16, 1998. 
On September 18, 1998, the Court had Harrington's Objection before it - indeed, it 
was part of the issue of the day.6 The court allowed Harrington's intervention and ordered 
it to file an answer on or before October 22, 1998 "if one is to be filed." The reason for the 
order is likewise clear. In order for a case or controversy to exist, at least one material 
allegation of the Petition must be controverted. Harrington's Objection merely questions 
the sufficiency of the petition. Thus, when Janet's counsel directed the trial court's attention 
to the lack of a sufficient answer, Judge Stirba correctly ruled that if Harrington was going 
to actually contest Janet's Petition, an answer must be filed prior to October 22nd. 
On October 28th, when the court entered Harrington's default, it was based on the 
explicit finding that Harrington had failed to answer as ordered by the Court. That factual 
finding is supported by the record and ample evidence. R. 132, 135; R. 295, Tr. Hearing 
9/18/98. Finally, on December 16,1998, Judge Maughan heard Harrington's argument that 
it had already filed an answer. See e.g. R. 294, Tr Hearing 12/16/98 pp. 15 - 16. He had 
6It must be presumed that Judge Stirba read the file prior to the September hearing and was aware 
of the objection and its contents. Clearly Judge Maughan had when he denied Harrington's Motion to Set 
Aside Default on December 16,1998, for he explicitly said so on the record. R. 294, Tr. Hearing 12/16/98 
p.4 11. 21, 22. 
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read the entire case file. R. 294, Tr. Hearing 12/16/98 p.411.21 - 22, p. 28 11. 1-3. So he had 
Harrington's Objection. R. 88-93. The simple fact is, no evidence was presented to the 
court that an answer was on file 
V. Harrington Cannot Seek Relief Under Rule 60(a). 
Harrington now argues that it should be granted relief pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 
60(a). Its premise is that there was a clerical mistake about whether an answer was on file. 
That is specious because as noted above, the Court made implicit and explicit factual 
findings that no answer had been filed. See R. 135. That was a correct judicial finding of 
fact, which Harrington has not properly attacked. Rule 60(a) is not applicable for resolution 
of factual disputes. Utah R. Civ. P. 60(a); see Lindsay v. Atkin., 680 P.2d 401 (Utah 1984). 
Furthermore, Harrington never argued this in the trial court. It cannot raise it for the 
first time here. That has been decided in the context of Rule 60(a) by this Court in Richins 
v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Co., Inc., 817 P.2d 382 (Utah App. 1991). In that case, the 
defendant's motion for relief under rule 60(b) was untimely and denied. He argued for the 
first time on appeal that the trial court also could have granted his motion under Rule 60(a) 
or under its "inherent authority." This Court declined to consider those arguments because 
they were raised for the first time on appeal. Richins ,817 P.2d at 387; see Franklin 
Financial v. New Empire Development Co., 659 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1983) (generally, issues 
raised for the first time in post-judgment motions are raised too late to be reviewed on 
appeal). Harrington cannot raise its Rule 60(a) motion for the first time on appeal. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly refused to set aside the default judgment. Harrington's 
Objection was not an answer as it puts no fact at issue. Even if it was an answer, default was 
proper because, without a factual dispute, the only question before the trial court was 
whether Janet's cause of action was properly pleaded. Harrington never raised that issue 
before the trial court or on appeal. Moreover, because it has not marshaled the evidence 
supporting the trial court's findings, Harrington has not properly appealed the trial court's 
finding that no answer was on file. Nor has it properly appealed the finding that undue 
hardship and prejudice would inure to Janet. Harrington's neglect was not excusable. 
Harrington has not tendered a meritorious defense and has not shown how the prejudice to 
Janet could be surmounted. In fact, the trial court would have abused its discretion if it had 
set aside the default. Janet, who was without fault would have lost her day in court 
completely. 
DATED this /3 day of September, 1999. 
McINTYRE & GOLDEN, L.C. 
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APPENDIX A 
SCOTT W. CHRISTENSEN, UBN 0649 
HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE, P.C. 
Attorneys for Intervener 
4 Triad Center, Ste. 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84180 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
In re: The Marriage of: 
DENNIS L. MITCHELL and 
JANET ROBINS MITCHELL. 
HARRINGTON TRUCKING'S REPLY 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS 
MOTION TO INTERVENE ,/>•-, n O f / 
Cj^-fW(c^^~l 
Civil No. -9*4-^ ©ir2T~ 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
COMES NOW Harrington Trucking, the intervener, and 
submits the following reply memorandum in support of its motion to 
intervene as a defendant. 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. Suit has been filed against Harrington Trucking in a 
separate action arising from an accident involving Janet C. Robins 
(Mitchell), Dennis L. Mitchell, and Harrington Trucking. This 
matter was filed in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, Civil No. 980901125 on behalf of Lindsy 
Mitchell. (See Attachment "A", Complaint.) 
&>L 
2. Janet C. Robins, through James A. Mclntyre, her 
attorney has filed a petition seeking appointment as guardian of 
Lindsy Lee Mitchell. This matter was filed in the Third District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Civil No. 
983900264. (See Attachment UB" , Petition for Appointment of 
Guardian and Conservator of Minor.) 
3. Harrington Trucking has filed a motion to stay the 
proceedings in the wrongful death matter until the controversy over 
who will be representing the interests in Lindsy Mitchell has been 
resolved. 
4. In the instant matter, counsel for Janet C. Robins, 
included counsel for Harrington Trucking in the mailing 
certificate, thereby advising it of petitioner's intention to have 
Mr. Robins declared the common law wife of Dennis L. Mitchell. 




HARRINGTON TRUCKING HAS PROVIDED 
SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR ESTABLISHING 
STANDING AND RIGHT TO INTERVENE. 
In evaluating Harrington Trucking's right to intervene, 
the issue of standing is not determined through an evaluation of 
the Utah common-law marriage statute, § 30-1-1-4.5, U.C.A. The 
case law interpreting an individual's right to intervene pending 
litigation examines the requirements of Rule 24 of Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure instead. Petitioner seeks to draw attention away 
from the requirements of Rule 24 by alleging that her action before 
this court is contractual in nature. An examination of the 
petition is illustrative. Neither in the petition nor in the 
affidavits submitted in support of her petition does petitioner 
assert any claims sounding in contract. It is obvious petitioner 
seeks a judicial declaration that she and the decedent complied 
with the requirements of § 30-1-4.5, Utah Code Annot. As such, she 
seeks the status of a common law spouse of the decedent by action 
of the court. 
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Certainly the requirements of § 30-1-4.5 are important in 
that determination. However, Harrington Trucking's right to 
intervene is determined by examining the effects of this 
determination, not the elements giving rise to it. 
If Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
the basis for standing, Harrington Trucking need not be a party to 
the alleged contract or to the common law marriage in order to be 
granted right to intervene. 
POINT II. 
HARRINGTON TRUCKING IS ENTITLED TO 
INTERVENE AS A MATTER OF RIGHT 
PURSUANT TO RULE 24(a) OF THE UTAH 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
Both the specific wording of Rule 24 and the applicable 
case law interpreting this rule support Harrington Trucking's 
efforts. Rule 24(a) states in part: 
Upon timely application anyone shall be 
permitted to intervene in an action: . . . (2) 
when the applicant claims an interest relating 
to the property or transaction which is the 
subject of the action and he is so situated 
that the disposition of the action may as a 
practical matter impair or impede his ability 
to protect that interest. (Emphasis added.) 
4 
A primary case in Utah interpreting Rule 24 is Lima v. 
Chambers, 657 P. 2d 279 (Utah 1982) . That case was analyzed in 
light of Rule 24, and the court held: 
[A] n applicant must be allowed to intervene if 
four requirements are met: (1) the application 
is timely; (2) the applicant has an interest 
in the subject matter of the dispute; (3) that 
interest is or may be inadequately 
represented; and (4) the applicant is or may 
be bound by a judgment in the action. 
657 P.2d at 282. 
In light of those factors, the court then ruled that an 
insurer who had provided uninsured motorist coverage was entitled 
to intervene in the litigation between its insured and a tort 
feasor. 
Earlier case law in Utah has elaborated on these 
essential elements. For example, in Commercial Block Realty Co. v. 
United State Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 83 Utah 414, 28 P.2d 1081, 
1083 (1934), the court ruled that for a party to intervene: 
he must have an interest in the matter in 
litigation, in the success of either of the 
parties, or an interest against both. 
It is clear from this language that the right to 
intervene shall be granted if the necessary requirements of Rule 24 
are met even though doing so may be adversarial to those involved 
in the underlying litigation. 
Later, in Interstate Land Corp. v. Patterson, 797 P.2d 
1101 (Utah App. 1990), the court again affirmed that 
The test usually applied to the right to 
intervene is whether the person seeking to 
intervene may gain or lose by a direct legal 
operation and the effect of the judgment. 
(Cite omitted.) 
797 P.2d at 1108. 
Finally, in Chatterton v. Walker, 938 P.2d 255 (Utah 
1997), the Supreme Court acknowledged that Rule 24 has been changed 
and discussed the effects of the amendment. They held: 
Instead of requiring applicants to show that 
they will be "bound by a judgment in the 
action", the rule now requires applicants to 
demonstrate only that "the disposition of the 
action may as a practical matter impair or 
impede [their] ability to protect that 
interest" . Thus the test of Rule 24 now 
mandates intervention on even more liberal 
terms than it did when we issued Lima. 
938 P.2d at 258. 
The Chatterton court acknowledged that the right to 
intervene is not without its limits. Those limitations on the 
scope and right to intervene 
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I - > 
are expressed by the rule itself and are 
related primarily to the scope of the 
intervener's interests and the timeliness of 
the intervener's application after adequate 
notice of the action. 
398 P.2d at Footnote 5. 
Nowhere in the memorandum in opposition of Harrington 
Trucking's motion to intervene does the petitioner deny that 
Harrington Trucking will both be bound by the determination of 
common law spouse status sought by the petitioner or could have 
additional exposure in the wrongful death claim by virtue of such 
a determination. 
In light of the Supreme Court's determination that 
intervention should now be more liberally allowed, and in light of 
petitioner's tacit acknowledgment that Harrington Trucking's 
interests are at stake in this matter, all the requirements of Rule 
24(a) have been met by intervener. 
POINT III. 
RULE 24(c) UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE HAVE ESSENTIALLY BEEN MET. 
The requirements of Rule 24 (c) have application where a 
responsive pleading setting forth claims or affirmative defenses 
would be required. Inasmuch as petitioner has filed no complaint, 
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no answer setting forth claims or defense is allowed. At most, 
pleadings setting forth objections to the petition are required. 
Intervener's motion meets that requirement. 
To the extent this court may determine an additional 
pleading is required, enclosed please find as Attachment D 
intervener's objection. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner, through her objection to Harrington 
Trucking's motion, has sought to characterize Harrington Trucking's 
efforts as "unconscionable". In doing so, petitioner misconstrues 
the purpose of Rule 24. As with all litigation, it is adversarial. 
Harrington Trucking's basis for intervention is Rule 24(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. While petitioner may neither agree 
with nor like Rule 24, it is clearly not unconscionable. 
Consistent with the earlier appellate court decisions on 
intervention,- the Chatterton court noted in Footnote 9 that "Rule 
24(a) makes clear that intervention is granted for the intervener's 
own interests ... ." It is absurd for petitioner to suggest that 
Harrington Trucking seeks to represent the decedent's interest in 
this matter. Harrington Trucking is adverse to the heirs and 
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estate of Mr. Mitchell. Because its interests are at issue in this 
claim and because Harrington Trucking's interest is not adequately 
represented by the existing parties, it is entitled as a matter of 
right to intervene in this matter. 
Therefore, Harrington Trucking respectfully requests this 
court enter an order allowing it to intervene in opposition to 
petitioner. 
DATED this " 7 * — — day of April, 1998. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE 
SCOTT W. CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
lid 
prepaid, this / day of April, 1998, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing to the following: 
Attorney for Petitioner: 
James A. Mclntrye, Esq. 
McINTRYE & GOLDEN, L.C. 
360 East 4500 South, Ste. 3 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Attorneys for Rebecca Colonna: 
David E. Sloan, Esq. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
50 South Main Street, Ste. 1600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Attorneys for Lindsy Mitchell: 
Michael F. Richman, Esq. 
5684 south Green Street 
Murray, UT 84123 
Preston L. Handy, Esq. 
SIEGFRIED Sc JENSEN 
5684 South Green Street 
Murray, UT 84123 
Janet C. Robins 
10316 South Violet Drive 
Sandy, UT 84 094 
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Arlene Grego 
1153 West 12400 South 
Riverton, UT 84065 
Willard Mitchell 
10563 South North Forty Way 
South Jordan, UT 84095 
Steve Mitchell 
1473 East Greenfield Avenue 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
Penny Mitchell 
1028 West Learned Avenue 
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SCOTT W. CHRISTENSEN, UBN 0649 
HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE, P.C, 
Attorneys for Intervener 
4 Triad Center, Ste. 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84180 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
In re: The Marriage of 
DENNIS L. MITCHELL and 
JANET ROBINS MITCHELL. 
HARRINGTON TRUCKING'S OBJECTION 
TO PETITION FOR JUDICIAL 
DECLARATION OF COMMON LAW MARRIAGI.: 
Civil No. <$%*& 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
^ tfrfloii&S 
COMES NOW Harrington Trucking and objects to the petition 
for judicial declaration of common law marriage filed in this 
matter by Janet Robins Mitchell. 
The basis for this objection is found in the motion to 
intervene and the accompanying memoranda filed by movant Harrington 
Trucking and upon the basis that the facts and affidavits submitted 
by petitioner are insufficient to satisfy the requirements of Utah 
Code Annot. § 31-1-4.5. 
DATED this V day of April, 1998. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE 
SCOTT W.(CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, this ' I-^ day of April, 1998, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing to the following: 
Attorney for Petitioner: 
James A. Mclntrye, Esq. 
McINTRYE & GOLDEN, L.C. 
360 East 4500 South, Ste. 3 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Attorneys for Rebecca Colonna: 
David E. Sloan, Esq. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
50 South Main Street, Ste. 1600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Attorneys for Lindsy Mitchell: 
Michael F. Richman, Esq. 
5684 south Green Street 
Murray, UT 84123 
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Preston L. Handy, Esq. 
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN 
5684 South Green Street 
Murray, UT 84123 
Janet C. Robins 
10316 South Violet Drive 
Sandy, UT 84094 
Arlene Grego 
1153 West 12400 South 
Riverton, UT 84065 
Willard Mitchell 
10563 South North Forty Way 
South Jordan, UT 84095 
Steve Mitchell 
1473 East Greenfield Avenue 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
Penny Mitchell 
1028 West Learned Avenue 





SCOTT W. CHRISTENSEN, UBN 0649 
HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE, P.C. 
Attorneys for Harrington Trucking, Inc. 
4 Triad Center, Ste. 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84180 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
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Third J Jriicif! District 
Deputy 3!ork 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SAL 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY 
In re: The Marriage of: 
DENNIS L. MITCHELL and 
JANET ROBINS MITCHELL. 
ANSWER TO VERIFIED PETITION 
FOR JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF 
COMMON LAW MARRIAGE 
Civil No. 984901224 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
Intervener, Harrington Trucking, Inc., hereby answers and 
contests Janet Robins Mitchell's Verified Petition for Judicial 
Declaration of Common Law Marriage as follows: 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
1. Intervener denies that Janet Robins Mitchell was co-
habitating as the common law wife of Dennis L. Mitchell, but 
otherwise admits paragraph 1 of petitioner's Petition. 
2. Intervener denies paragraph 2 of petitioner's Petition. 
3. Intervener denies paragraph 3 of petitioner's Petition. 
4. Intervener admits that Dennis L. Mitchell died on December 
29, 1997/ however, intervener denies each and every other 
allegation in paragraph 4 of petitioner's petition. 
5. Intervener denies paragraph 5 of petitioner's Petition. 
6. Intervener denies paragraph 6 of petitioner's Petition. 
7. Intervener denies paragraph 7 of petitioner's Petition. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Petitioner's request is barred by the doctrines of laches and 
estoppel. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Petitioner's Petition fails to state the elements of common 
law marriage as required by Utah Code Ann. §30-1-4.5. 
Therefore, intervener, Harrington Trucking, Inc., respectfully 
requests that petitioner's Petition be denied and this court 
determine as a matter of law that Janet Robins Mitchell was not the 
common law wife of Dennis Mitchell. 
Respectfully submitted this ^T^ydj^y of October, 1998. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE 
*T 
X)TT W. CHRISTENSEN) 
(ttorneys for Intervener 
larrington Trucking, Inc. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, 
thi day of October, 1998, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing to the following: 
-2-
Attorney for Petitioner: 
James A. Mclntyre 
McINTYRE & GOLDEN, L.C. 
360 East 4500 South, Ste 3 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Attorney for Rebecca Colonna: 
David E. Sloan, Esq. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
50 South Main Street, Ste. 1600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Ms. Lindsay Mitchell 
C/o Janet C. Robins 
10316 South Violet Drive 
Sandy, UT 84094 
James R. Boud, Esq. 
ASHTON, BRAUNBERGER & BOUD, P.C. 
765 East 9000 South, Suite A-l 
Sandy, UT 84094 
Attorney for Arlene Grego 
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APPENDIX C 
JAMES A. McINTYRE - 2196 
McINTYRE & GOLDEN, L.C. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
360 East 4500 South, Suite 3 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 266-3399 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 


















In this action the Intervenor, Harrington Trucking, Inc., 
having been instructed to file an Answer by October 22, 1998, in 
the Minutes Oral Argument Notice dated September 18, 1998, the 
Intervenor, Harrington Trucking, Inc., having failed to file an 
Answer to Petitioner's Verified Petition for Judicial Declaration 
of Common Law Marriage on file herein, and the Estate of Dennis L. 
Mitchell, having accepted service of the Petition for Judicial 
Declaration of Common Law Marriage on March 12, 1998, the time 
allowed by law for answering having expired, the default of the 
Estate of Dennis Mitchell, and said Intervenor, Harrington 
Trucking, Inc., in the premises is hereby duly entered according to 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
Deputy Clerk 
law. 
ATTEST my hand, and the seal of said Court, this <r^^^ day 
of
 QckHC , 193&. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage pre-paid, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing DEFAULT CERTIFICATE to the following 
on this J ^ t h day of October, 1998. 
David E. Sloan 
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Michael F. Richman 
Attorney at Law 
5684 South Green Street 
Murray, Utah 84123 
Preston L. Handy 
Siegfried & Jensen 
5684 South Green Street 
Murray, Utah 84123 
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Arlene Greco 
1153 West 12400 South 
Riverton, Utah 84065 
Willard Mitchell 
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Steve Mitchell 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In re: The Marriage of: 
DENNIS L. MITCHELL and 
JANET ROBINS MITCHELL. 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT & JUDICIAL 
DECLARATION OF COMMON LAW 
MARRIAGE 
Civil No. 984901224 
Honorable Anne M. Stirba 
The Estate of Dennis Mitchell and the Intervenor, Harrington 
Trucking, having failed to plead or otherwise defend in this action 
and default having been entered. 
IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner is granted a Judicial 
Declaration of Common Law Marriage. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DECLARED that all persons entitled to 
notice have received notice, and the Default Certificate having 
been entered on , the union of Dennis L. Mitchell and 
Janet Robins Mitchell is hereby declared a common law marriage, 
legal, binding and valid, nunc pro tunc, as of April 28, 1987. 
DATED this 2-8 day of Q c | p ^ _ _ _ , 1968. 
BY THE COURT; 
District Court Jud-#^S-
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage pre-paid, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing DEFAULT JUDGMENT & JUDICIAL 
DECLARATION OF COMMON LAW MARRIAGE to the following on this £>"^ 
day of October, 1998. 
]
rt/yidJA/)d-r^y 
David E. Sloan 
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Michael F. Richman 
Attorney at Law 
5684 South Green Street 
Murray, Utah 84123 
Preston L. Handy 
Siegfried & Jensen 
5684 South Green Street 
Murray, Utah 84123 
2 
Scott W. Christensen 
Mark J. Williams 
Hanson, Epperson & Smith 
4 Triad Center, Suite #500 
P.O. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Janet C. Robins 
10316 South Violet Drive 
Sandy, Utah 84094 
Arlene Greco 
1153 West 12400 South 
Riverton, Utah 84065 
Willard Mitchell 
10563 South North Forty Way 
South Jordan, Utah 84095 
Steve Mitchell 
1473 East Greenfield Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Penny Mitchell 
1028 West Learned Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
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The Videotape Transcript of the proceedings held on 
the 16th, day of December, 1998, before Janet Loveless, a 
Certified Shorthand Reporter, Registered Professional 
Reporter, Utah License No. 356646, and Notary Public in and 
for the State of Utah. 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 THE COURT: Good morning, counsel. I appreciate 
3 your willingness to come here on such short time. I hope 
4 you appreciate the Court's willingness as well. 
5 Would you state your appearances for the record, 
6 please. 
7 MR. MCINTYRE: Your Honor, James Mclntyre for 
8 Janet Robins Mitchell, the petitioner in this matter. 
9 THE COURT: Okay. 
10 MR. KERR: Jason Kerr, for intervenor Harrington 
11 Trucking. 
12 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Kerr. 
13 So you've had an order today, a recommended— is 
14 it an order or recommendation? 
15 MR. MCINTYRE: The way that this procedure 
16 normally works, your Honor, is that the Commissioner makes a 
17 recommendation, there is an objection filed, which--
18 THE COURT: Right, which puts it before— 
19 MR. MCINTYRE: Which puts it before you, and so 
20 it's not yet an order of the Court. Although, once it's 
21 announced, it becomes an order of the Court during the 
22 interim. 
23 THE COURT: Until it's changed, that's right. 
24 MR. MCINTYRE: Right. 


























MR. MCINTYRE: It's my burden to 




COURT: You may do so. 
go forward, in 
MCINTYRE: Thank you. Your Honor, I think 
it would be helpful to--
THE COURT: Before you begin, let 
the record that we're dealing with the case 






MCINTYRE: It is actually in 
COURT: In the matter of? 
MCINTYRE: Correct. 
me just make for 
of Mitchell 
the matter of. 
COURT: In the matter of in re the marriage of 


















MCINTYRE: That is correct. 
COURT: Case #984901224. You 
MCINTYRE: Thank you, your He 
I'm going to proceed a little 
right. I think that perhaps 
k at the background of how we 
is that correct? 
may proceed. 
nor. Your Honor, 
bit differently, 
it would be well 
get to this 
COURT: You may do so briefly. I've read the 
— 
MCINTYRE: I understand. 
COURT: But you can. If you 
, you may do so. 
want 
1 MR. MCINTYRE: May I come forward? 
2 THE COURT: You may. 
3 MR. MCINTYRE: What I have done is I've copied the 
4 provision of the statute that we will be proceeding under 
5 because it is somewhat unusual. In terms of determining a 
6 valid marriage that hasn't been solemnized, you have to 
7 prove the five elements that have traditionally represented 
8 a common law marriage, but the legislature has thrown a 
9 wrinkle in it. And that wrinkle is found in paragraph 2, 
10 which says, "The determination or establishment of a 
11 marriage under this section must occur during the 
12 relationship described in section 1 or within one year 
13 following the termination of that relationship. Evidence of 
14 a marriage recognizable under this section may be manifested 
15 in any form and may be proved under the same general rules 
16 of evidence as are facts in other cases." 
17 And our appellate courts have had occasion to make 
18 rulings on that particular section. And if I may? 
19 THE COURT: You may. 
20 MR. MCINTYRE: The case is called Bunch vs. 
21 Hagelhorn. And if I may summarize that to the Court, what— 
22 essentially what this case says, and what the cases upon 
23 which it is based say, is the legislature meant exactly what 
24 it said, this is a statute of repose to the ultimate, in the 
25 sense that i f — the Court must make its determination within 
1 that one-year period of time. 
2 In this case, my client's husband was killed in an 
3 automobile accident between Harrington Trucking and the 
4 vehicle in which he was riding, on December 29th, 1997. 
5 Which means that we have until-- as I've read the statute 
6 and as other practitioners that I've spoken with read the 
7 statute, that means within gives us until December 28th, 
8 1998 to have a determination made, a declaration of this 
9 valid marriage made. 
10 That issue was raised before Judge Stirba in the 
11 hearing that we had in September on the objection to the 
12 commissioner's recommendation allowing intervention, and at 
13 that time, Judge Stirba entered a very specific order. And 
14 that order, if I may, says, "The Court orders discovery to 
15 be completed by October 19th. Respondents are instructed to 
16 file an answer by October 22nd if they intend to do so. And 
17 this case is set for evidentiary hearing on November 12th at 
18 9:30 a.m. " 
19 They did not file an answer. At the time that 
20 Judge Stirba entered that order, I nad notified the Court 
21 and counsel for Harrington Trucking. There was no answer on 
22 file. What we had done in this case is we had sent out— we 
23 had actually served the estate of Dennis Mitchell as the 
24 proper party to be served, and not surprisingly, they didn't 
25 answer objecting to it. We sent copies of the pleadings to 
1 every heir,of Dennis Mitchell and to Harrington Trucking. 
2 Harrington Trucking is the only party-- the only person that 
3 was actually given notice of this proceeding who responded 
4 in any way. 
5 THE COURT: Why did you send notice to Harrington? 
6 MR. MCINTYRE: Because we felt that it was 
7 important to them to have that notice because if they were 
8 going to intervene, they could intervene or try to. They 
9 came into court, asked to intervene. And under the rules of 
10 intervention, they're not required to file an answer. But 
11 if they don't file an answer, then they must rely upon the 
12 answer that's filed by someone else. In this case, there 
13 was no answer filed whatsoever. 
14 So when Judge Stirba uttered the words, If you 
15 intend to file an answer, you need to do it by October 22nd. 
16 What was meant by that is without an answer, a default will 
17 be entered because there's nobody that's contravening, 
18 nobody that's objecting to the declaration of this valid 
19 marriage other than Harrington Trucking. And Janet Mitchell 
20 J is not left with any way to know what is controverted and 
21 what is not. 
22 Now, why in the world anyone would controvert that 
23 Janet Mitchell had the right to consent to a valid marriage 
24 or that she was under any impediment of entering into a 
25 marriage is beyond me. But the answer that was ultimately 
1 filed, Harrington Trucking did that because they say they 
2 didn't have an opportunity to conduct discovery. 
3 All of the discovery that they did conduct, with 
4 the exception of what I voluntarily provided to them— 
5 because at that hearing or following that hearing, I spoke 
6 with Mr. Williams and said, Look, I'll have my client gather 
7 together everything that she can gather and we'll give to it 
8 to you, which we did do. All the other discovery that 
9 Harrington Trucking conducted was conducted in a wrongful 
10 death case. They didn't conduct one bit of discovery in 
11 this case. But their claim is, Gee, we didn't have a chance 
12 to answer this Complaint because we didn't have the 
13 opportunity to conduct discovery. But they never did it. 
14 Discovery was ordered to be completed by the 19th 
15 and I was ordered to cooperate with that, which I feel I 
16 fully did. They didn't file an answer, and we asked the 
17 Court and the Court entered a default judgment. We also 
18 sent them notice that we were going in and applying for that 
19 default judgment. Which I think if we hadn't done that, 
20 they never would have filed an answer. But we sent the 
21 notice in, they then filed an answer the same day that the 
22 default is entered. 
23 Your Honor, the rules— Rule 60(b) is quite clear. 
24 Rule 60(b) is a rule of equity. And Rule 60(b) has three 
25 requirements. It has a requirement that a motion to set 
1 aside be timely filed, that there will be excusable neglect, 
2 and that there be a meritorious defense alleged. The 
3 commissioner found that those three things were there. The 
4 problem with that is the commissioner completely disregarded 
5 the rule of equity, that there not be prejudice to the 
6 nonmoving party. 
7 In this case we1re faced with a situation where 
8 today is the 16th of December. If looking at the Court's 
9 calendar, it appears that we would have two days left in 
10 this week, we would have four days of next week and we would 
11 have one day of the following week in which the Court could 
12 make a determination. That is, assuming that everybody who 
13 is a party to this action could accommodate that kind of a 
14 schedule. 
15 We had a trial date that was set before this Court 
16 that we could have had a hearing, had Harrington filed the 
17 answer that they should have. They're claiming excusable 
18 neglect, but they knew they had those deadlines. And we're 
19 now sitting in a position where, quite frankly, I filed my 
20 Affidavit and my Affidavit is-- I asked my secretary to look 
21 at my calendar and see what days I have available. I know 
22 that all of next week is basically taken up with a trial 
23 before Judge Iwasaki. I have a hearing-- I have hearings 
24 all day tomorrow. I have-- at least, unless it's been 
25 canceled, I have hearings all day tomorrow. I may have some 
time on the 18th and I may have some time on the 28th. But 
the problem is we also have witnesses that we have to get 
together. 
Wefve now shifted the burden from Harrington 
Trucking to set aside the default, we've shifted the burden 
back to Janet Mitchell on an extremely abbreviated basis. 
THE COURT: Let me ask this question. Why was the 
trial-- or the hearing set in November, why wasn't that 
addressed sooner than today? It was struck on the default, 
but what's happened between--
MR. MCINTYRE: Not a thing. Why it was ever 
scheduled in front of the commissioner instead of the Court, 
that's a jurisdictional question that I haven't even got 
into. But, quite frankly, I don't know how the commissioner 
has jurisdiction over this matter. This is not one of those 
matters that the-- that the rules allow the commissioner to 
have jurisdiction over. The commissioner's jurisdiction is 
limited to divorces, adoptions, paternity actions, those 
sorts of.things. But declarations of marriage are not one 
of the things that commissioners have jurisdiction over. 
I don't believe— I don't know this for a fact, 
but my belief is a commissioner cannot marry someone unless 
they happen to be a marriage commissioner authorized by the 
clerk of the Court. I don't know. I haven't researched 
that issue, but it certainly is an issue. I thought a 
1 commissioner's jurisdiction was limited to those items that 
2 were specifically delegated under the rules of 
3 administrative procedure. I donft think this is one of 
4 those matters. But even laying that aside, I cannot answer 
5 the question of why this was not addressed first or earlier. 
6 It certainly wasn't because of a problem with my calendar or 
7 my unavailability. 
8 The other-- the last thing that I have is a case--
9 I did find one case. And I didn't have much time to do 
10 this, but — 
11 THE COURT: I understand. 
12 MR. MCINTYRE: If I might approach? 
13 THE COURT: Yes, you may. 
14 MR. MCINTYRE: I did some really quick research on 
15 the equities and the rules with regard to Rule 60(b) being 
16 an equitable remedy and whether or not it was appropriate to 
17 set aside. I certainly hope that I've found the right rule. 
18 But it says, "In deciding whether a default judgment should 
19 be set aside"— 
20 THE COURT: Where are you reading? 
21 MR. MCINTYRE: I'm just reading from the headnote 
22 under No. 3, your Honor. It says, "In deciding whether a 
23 default judgment should be set aside, the Court should 
24 balance the equities on a case-by-case basis, including such 
25 considerations as preference to allowing presentation of all 
1 claims and defenses, any delay or unfairness in the party's 
2 conduct, the need for finality of judgments and the 
3 respective hardships in denying or granting relief." I 
4 think the hardship in this case in granting the motion to 
5 set aside the default judgment is we're faced with a 
6 jurisdictional problem here. I believe that this Court 
7 loses jurisdiction to determine that there's a valid 
8 marriage on the 29th of December. I just don't think-- I 
9 think the case lot is clear, I don't think that there's any 
10 choice in that matter. 
11 There is a prejudice to the petitioner if the 
12 default judgment is set aside, that is the ultimate 
13 prejudice. Her marriage can never be declared valid if it's 
14 not done by the 29th of December. We are in the dilemma of 
15 having to prepare in very short order for a trial that we 
16 didn't think was going to happen. The reason we didn't 
17 think there was going to be a trial was because the Court 
18 had already entered an order declaring that the marriage was 
19 valid. 
20 And, frankly, the time that's available for both 
21 the Court's calendar and for my calendar is extremely short. 
22 I don't mean to— maybe this isn't a good reason, but it's a 
23 practical reason. I have other clients that I have to 
24 represent. I have to take my time to be prepared for their 
25 cases and I have their cases already scheduled and have been 
for a long time. This case was scheduled to be tried in 
November. It wasn't tried in November because Harrington 
Trucking defaulted. 
Their default-- they are now saying, Well, that's 
excusable, we have good reasons for making the default. 
Even assume that that's all true, there is no bad conduct-
or there is no conduct on the part of the petitioner that in 
any way kept them from coming back before Judge Stirba long 
before the 12th of November. 
If they wanted to set aside, why didn't they come 
in and say, Let's have a hearing on whether or not this 
ought to be set aside so that we can still have our hearing 
on November 12th. That was never done. They wait until the 
15th of December and say, Poor me, poor me. I need to have 
the Court accommodate our failure to diligently pursue the 
remedy we asked for. We asked for intervention. We've been 
allowed by the Court to intervene, but we failed to 
contravene any of the allegations until the 28th, after the 
default had been entered. 
So that's the reason that I believe it is 
absolutely unfair and prejudicial to my client and that's 
why— and I very much appreciate the Court accommodating us 
on what is admittedly very short notice. 
THE COURT: I have one procedural question. In 
the file the intervenor does say, in effect, we're not sure 
1 what we have to do to oppose this, but we have filed an 
2 objection to the petition. Is that— does that obviate a 
3 need for an answer, does that--
4 MR. MCINTYRE: No, it doesn't. And the reason it 
5 doesn't is that issue was addressed by Judge Stirba. 
6 THE COURT: Okay. 
7 MR. MCINTYRE: That issue was addressed by Judge 
8 Stirba in September when she said-- I mean, we brought up 
9 the issue. And my point to the Judge at that point was, 
10 Your Honor, I've alleged in my petition all of the-- I just 
11 ticked off the statutory requirements for a declaration of a 
12 valid marriage. It seems pretty clear to me that nobody is 
13 going to deny that Janet Mitchell is able to consent to her 
14 own marriage. I mean, she's not married to anybody else, 
15 there's just no reason to deny it. So I need to know what 
16 allegations there is a good faith basis for denying and 
17 which ones there aren't. And because no one else has filed 
18 an answer to this case, I'm entitled to a default at this 
19 point. She said, Well, I'm going to give them until October 
20 22nd to file an answer. 
21 THE COURT: Okay. 
22 MR. MCINTYRE: At least that's my recollection of 
23 the colloquy that went back and forth before the Court. I 
24 don't know that there's any specific order on that. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Kerr. 
1 MR. KERR: First, just to clarify one issue, the 
2 hearing on November 12th, I believe was to be before 
3 Judge Stirba. Okay. Now, let me-- I'd like to back up a 
4 little bit and talk to the Court about what actually 
5 happened and led up to this default judgment. 
6 The motion to intervene was filed way back in 
7 April, I believe. Let me double-check that. Excuse me. 
8 March 24th, 1998. In April-- on April 7th of 1998, 
9 Harrington Trucking, as the Court noticed, filed an 
10 objection to the petition for declaration of common law 
11 marriage. And attached to that, the memorandum in support I 
12 thereof, was what was an answer. Again, we didn't know in 
13 April or May or June or July whether or not we could even I 
14 file an answer. Rule 24, under which we made the I 
15 intervention, makes no mention of filing an answer. We | 
16 didn't even know, up until the Court's order in October, 
17 that we could even file an answer. j 
18 What happened was we were under an extremely 
19 abbreviated time schedule. 
20 THE COURT: Let's stop right there for a minute. 
21 You say that you didn't know you could file an answer or you 
22 didn't understand the rules or the procedures that were— 
23 MR. KERR: It was unclear because our motion to 
24 intervene and our— really wasn't effectively granted, my 
25 understanding, until October. That was my understanding, 
1 because the report and recommendation had been objected to. 
2 And it wasn't clear to anyone, I don't think, that we needed 
3 to file an answer until October-- until the October order 
4 when the judge specifically stated, You need to file an--
5 you need to file an answer on this date. Okay. 
6 But way back in April we'd sort of foreseen this 
7 problem and said, Okay, if something comes up, if additional 
8 pleading is necessary, we're going to attach this, this will 
9 serve as our answer. The Court will note that the Answer— 
10 the Supplementary Answer we filed on the 28th of October is 
11 essentially the same, it's in the form of a general denial. 
12 So the argument that they didn't have notice that-- what we 
13 would be objecting to really is without merit. 
14 THE COURT: But the fact is you were ordered to do 
15 an answer, not--
16 MR. KERR: That's correct. 
17 THE COURT: You couldn't rely on what you'd 
18 already filed. 
19 MR. KERR: Well, I don't know. See, my 
20 understanding— 
21 THE COURT: The Court's order was to file an 
22 answer. 
23 MR. KERR: Right. Let me back up a little bit 
24 too. The attorney who was present on the October hearing— 
25 MR. MCINTYRE: It's September. 
1 MR. KERR: I'm sorry. September. The September 
2 hearing was Mr. Williams from our office. Mr. Christensen 
3 is the lead attorney on the case. Mr. Christensen filed all 
4 the pleadings. I don't know if Mr. Williams was aware of 
5 Exhibit-D. Okay. I don't know if he knew at the time. I 
6 don't know what went on there at that hearing so I can't 
7 tell you, but all I know is what's in the Court's order. 
8 On to the issue of the abbreviated time schedule, 
9 we have interviewed several witnesses on our own, we've done 
10 some informal discovery. Their— plaintiff's counsel has 
11 been very kind in trying to-- was very kind in trying to 
12 work it out and we did work out most of the discovery 
13 issues. There was a delay, however, because there was some 
14 objections to what materials would be going to certain 
15 parties. And we sent a letter saying that we wouldn't 
16 reveal certain materials we got directly from the plaintiff 
17 to other parties. Once he got that letter, then he turned 
18 over the documents. But there was some confusion there. 
19 Furthermore, given the tight, tight schedule that 
20 we were under, it just— it was simply excusable neglect, it 
21 was inadvertence, as the rule specifically states. Now, 
22 Rule 60(b), as the petitioner's counsel has correctly 
23 indicated, states that-- there are three requirements under 
24 Rule 60(b) for granting a motion to set aside default 
25 judgement. 
1 Do you mind if I take this? 
2 MR. MCINTYRE: Oh, no, not at all. 
3 MR. KERR: I only made one copy of the Court's— 
4 the Report and Recommendation of the commissioner on that. 
5 I'd just like to read from that Recommendation, though. It 
6 states that, "It is the finding of this Court that 
7 Harrington Trucking, Inc. has shown all of the requirements 
8 for setting aside default judgment under Rule 60(b)." 
9 Then it specifically mentions certain things. I'm 
10 reading from paragraph A. "Specifically, Harrington 
11 Trucking has shown that this motion to set aside was 
12 timely." 
13 I actually went down and printed out a copy of the 
14 docket from the day, the 28th, when we filed our motion. I 
15 think it's interesting to note that on the docket from this 
16 Court, 10-28-98 filed Answer to Verified Petition for 
17 Judicial Declaration. There was also a memorandum to 
18 support a motion to set aside default. The default 
19 certificate is actually entered in after. So that's how 
20 timely we were. We got our motion and our Answer in 
21 before— I assume— I presume that the dates and the order 
22 has some relevance to when they actually received it down at 
23 the clerk's office. We actually got ours in before the 
24 petitioner got their default certificate filed with the 
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a date on December 4th of this year, but that was 
one. So, again, that's after November 12th. 
However, 'there was scheduling difficulty and 
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to file the default judgement--
they did. And given— they she 
I think, that given the short peric 
We didn't— we 
- or default 
Duld have 
3d of time that 
1 we had, that we were going to file a motion for excusable 
2 neglect. And that for whatever reason, they didn't really 
3 want to go forward with this November 12th hearing on the 
4 merits. 
5 I think that's important because the Supreme Court 
6 has stated very clearly that the presumption should be in 
7 favor of hearing a case on the merits. I'd just like to 
8 read a brief statement from the Supreme Court on this issue. 
9 This is in the case of-- this is in the briefs, by the way. 
10 It's Interstate Excavating, Inc. vs. Angola Development, 611 
11 P 2nd, 369 Utah, 1980. 
12 The Supreme Court states, "Where there is doubt 
13 about whether a default should be set aside, the doubt 
14 should be resolved in favor of doing so, to the end that 
15 each party may have an opportunity to present his side of 
16 the controversy and that there be a resolution in accordance 
17 with law and justice." 
18 We are willing to go forward anytime the Court 
19 wants to between now and the 29th, if that's an issue. 
20 We've also stated that this one-year time limitation-- and 
21 I'll state it here again— I don't know if it's 
22 jurisdictional or if it's in the matter of the statute of 
23 limitations, which can be waived. We will not bring it up 
24 as an affirmative defense if we decide to have the hearing 































at any time 
fine with that. We are willing to go 
on the merits of this action, because 
that the merits will clearly show that Ms. Robins 
the common 1 
THE COURT: 






marriage. But wheth 
between 
certain 
her and her 
MR. KERR: 
information 
aw spouse of Mr. Mitchell. 
Tell me, why does this proceeding 
it, as opposed to challenging this in 
We can't challenge it in another 
Well, you can't challenge her 
ter she's married or not, isn't that 
family? 
Well, we weren't going to until some 
we 
came to light. Okay. Some of the other 
heirs came to us. By the way, there's already an action 
filed, c a. wrongful death action, by certain heirs of 
Mr. Mitchell. Certain of those heirs came to us and stated 
that Mr . Mitchell was never married to Ms. -Robins. 
THE COURT: 
the heirs to come tc 
behalf < of them? 
MR. KERR: 
Even so, isn't that the prerogative 
> this action instead of you come on 
I don't why they didn't. But also, 
this really is a matter o f — on the motion to intervene. 
asking i 
THE COURT: 
tfhat this is 
And it's been granted. I'm just 
based on. 
of 
1 MR. KERR: Oh, why are we doing it? We don't 
2 believe Ms. Mitchell-- or Ms. Robins is an heir. And if she 
3 isn't an heir, she's not entitled to recovery under the 
4 wrongful death statute. 
5 THE COURT: Yes. But I'm saying, isn't that 
6 really a matter for another date? 
7 MR. KERR: This is the only day that we can bring 
8 it. That issue can only be brought in this proceeding. 
9 THE COURT: She's not a party to the wrongful 
10 death petition. 
11 MR. KERR: That's right. That's why we had to 
12 bring a motion to intervene, which was previously granted. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. 
14 MR. KERR: And I think that was the issue that was 
15 decided. Really, we're only here to decide whether or not 
16 default should be entered. 
17 THE COURT: All right. So you're prepared to try 
18 this anytime between now and the 28th? 
19 MR. KERR: Anytime that the Court wishes to do so. 
20 THE COURT: How long do you propose this would 
21 take in terms of time? 
22 MR. MCINTYRE: Your Honor, I guess the problem 
23 that I have is that I hadn't anticipated this, but— 
24 THE COURT: I know. But if we were to hear this, 
25 how long— 
1 MR. MCINTYRE: I think it was previously set by 
2 Judge Stirba for a full day, and so I would think it would 
3 take a full day. 
4 MR. KERR: I believe that's--
5 MR. MCINTYRE: That was her estimation at the 
6 time, that was mine at the time. I mean, I have some 
7 responses to their point. 
8 THE COURT: I'm not ruling, I'm just asking. 
9 MR. MCINTYRE: I know. My estimation would be 
10 about a day. 
11 THE COURT: Do you agree, Mr. Kerr? 
12 MR. KERR: I believe that is accurate, yes. 
13 THE COURT: Are you through or did you— 
14 MR. KERR: Yes, unless you have any more 
15 questions. Thank you. 
16 THE COURT: Mr. Mclntyre, do you have a response? 
17 MR. Mclntyre: I do, your Honor. 
18 First of all, the disadvantage. I mean, the 
19 disadvantage is having to try the case on short notice. 
20 Now, they're saying, Well, that was the reason that our 
21 neglect is excusable was because we had a very short 
22 discovery schedule, but at least they knew about it. And 
23 they had not just the month of the October. I mean, the 
24 hearing was held on September 18th. 
25 Judge Stirba entered an order on September 18th 
1 that said, If you want to file an answer, do it within-- and 
2 I believe it was 40 days. Not the normal 20 that you get to 
3 answer a complaint, they had more than enough time to file 
4 an answer. They didn't do it. I suspect that if we hadn't 
5 filed a motion, and we filed our motion and sent them a copy 
6 of it way before the time they filed their motion to set 
7 aside the judgment. 
8 Now, in terms of heirs who have come to them and 
9 said they objected because Mrs. Mitchell wasn't married to 
10 Mr. Mitchell, every heir that I know of-- and I represent 
11 the estate— every heir that I know of signed an affidavit 
12 in support of the petition. So if they've recanted, I'm not 
13 aware of that. But I just don't know that there is anybody 
14 else. 
15 And at this point, as I say, the prejudice is in 
16 the preparation time and I don't know how we resolve that. 
17 And somebody is going to be prejudiced here. With respect 
18 to whether or not Harrington Trucking is really prejudiced, 
19 what their claim is is that they will have a more difficult 
20 burden if they chose in the wrongful death case to oppose 
21 the claim made by Mrs. Mitchell as an heir. Mrs. Mitchell 
22 is the personal representative for the estate, she is the 
23 heir under Mr. Mitchell's will. She is his wife under this 
24 declaration. 
25 Now, if they want to claim that this declaration 
1 of common law marriage was not made after a trial on the 
2 merit, they're entitled to make that argument. So I don't— 
3 of the prejudice to either party, the greater prejudice is 
4 to Mrs. Mitchell by setting aside the default, as opposed to 
5 the prejudice that's visited upon Harrington Trucking. 
6 And let's not lose sight of the fact that it's 
7 Harrington Trucking that killed Mrs. Mitchell's husband. 
8 She was in the vehicle to see Dennis Mitchell die. And 
9 they're the ones who are coming into Court saying, Gee, this 
10 Court shouldn't declare the marriage valid. And if we don't 
11 have the hearing before the 29th, the Court may lose the 
12 power to do it. I don't know whether it can be waived or 
13 not. My frank opinion is that our courts— our appellate 
14 courts have ruled that the jurisdictional requirements of 
15 the statute may not be waived. 
16 And I just feel very uncomfortable being put in a 
17 position where I have to try a case on such extremely short 
18 notice, without time to prepare, or I have to sacrifice the 
19 interests of other clients. I'm put into a position— I'm 
20 in a two-man law office. I don't have somebody that can 
21 come in and help me out to a great deal because my partner 
22 is as busy as I am. I've got trials that are scheduled— I 
23 mean, contested divorce matters in front of Judge Iwasaki 
24 next week. I had planned to use today or even right as soon 
25 as this hearing was over, I planned to use that as part of 
1 my prep time because Ifve got other transcripts. 
2 So I'm in a real disadvantage and it's a real 
3 disadvantage. Not only that, ITve gone from a position-- or 
4 my client has gone from a position where she has a judicial 
5 declaration that her marriage was valid, to a position where 
6 she has the burden of proof, if this judgment is set aside. 
7 THE COURT: Okay. 
8 MR. KERR: Your Honor, could I make two quick 
9 points? 
10 THE COURT: Briefly. I 
11 MR. KERR: First, the discovery cutoff for this j 
12 matter was actually on November 19th, which was before the ; 
13 date the.petitioner filed the default judgment. So all the i 
14 preparation should have, for the large part, been completed. 
15 Second, they stated that we can always oppose the j 
16 finding of thr s Court in a later proceeding. That's really 
17 not true. We'll be barred by a collateral estoppel. This 
18 is the proper forum to make a final determination of the 
19 status of Ms. Robins' relationship with Mr. Mitchell. 
20 MR. MCINTYRE: Your Honor, that's just not true. 
21 The discovery cutoff was October 19th. We mailed on October 
22 27th the default. 
23 THE COURT: Okay. The Court is ready to order, if 
24 you're ready to hear. And it's the— I'd like you to know, 
25 I don't know if this is going to matter on any of the order, 
1 but, again, that we did go through the file. I read the 
2 file and I know what?s in it and I know the history. I 
3 appreciate your background. 
4 But the order of the Court will be to reverse the 
5 -recommendation of finding of the commissioner for the 
6 following reasons and reinstate the default judgment against 
7 the intervenor— and tell me the trucking company. I'm 
8 sorry. 
9 MR. KERR: Harrington Trucking. 
10 THE COURT: — Harrington Trucking, for the 
11 following reasons. The Court's order previously ordered 
12 Harrington Trucking to file an answer if they were going to 
13 answer, by-- and help me with the dates. October--
14 MR. KERR: October 22nd, I believe. 
15 THE COURT: October 22nd, which was 41 days from 
16 the time of the entry of the order. The order did— also 
17 set an abbreviated discovery schedule. And based on that, 
18 because of both of those items, the additional length of 
19 time granted to answer and the shortened discovery schedule 
20 should have— did not give Harrington Trucking excusable 
21 neglect. If anything, it should have put them on more 
22 notice, on a heightened notice, that they were to answer 
23 because of the specificity of the order. It may have been 
24 timely and there may be cause, but it was not based on 
25 excusable neglect. 
1 Also, the provisions of Rule 60(b) do address the 
2 issue of prejudice. And because of the jurisdictional 
3 nature of the statute, which says that this common law 
4 marriage must be established within one year, that time is 
5 running. And because of the schedule of the Court and the 
6 schedule of the counsel, that cannot be compiled with 
7 without undue hardship and prejudice to the petitioner at 
8 this point, and because other avenues exist. Because this 
9 may have an impact, is what Harrington Trucking stated in 
10 its petition— its objection to its petition and into its 
11 answer. It may have an adverse effect is not sufficient 
12 grounds to outweigh the prejudice, the actual prejudice that 
13 will be sustained by the petitioner in this action. 
14 Do you need anything further? 
15 MR. MCINTYRE: No. Thank you, your Honor. 
16 MR. KERR: Thank you, your Honor. 
17 THE COURT: Will you prepare the order? 
18 MR. KERR: I will, your Honor. Thank you, 
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Utah Code § 30-1-4.5 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 30. HUSBAND AND WIFE 
CHAPTER 1. MARRIAGE 
(Information regarding effective dates, 
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in 
this document.) 
Current through End of 1998 General Sess. 
§ 30-1-4.5. Validity of marriage not 
solemnized 
(1) A marriage which is not solemnized 
according to this chapter shall be legal and valid 
if a court or administrative order establishes that 
it arises out of a contract between two consenting 
parties who: 
(a) are capable of giving consent; 
(b) are legally capable of entering a solemnized 
marriage under the provisions of this chapter; 
(c) have cohabited; 
(d) mutually assume marital rights, duties, and 
obligations; and 
(e) who hold themselves out as and have 
acquired a uniform and general reputation as 
husband and wife. 
(2) The determination or establishment of a 
marriage under this section must occur during 
the relationship described in Subsection (1), or 
within one year following the termination of that 
relationship. Evidence of a marriage 
recognizable under this section may be 
manifested in any form, and may be proved 
under the same general rules of evidence as facts 
in other cases. 
As enacted by Chapter 246, Laws of Utah 1987. 
Search this disc for cases citing this section. 
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*128 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60 
WEST'S UTAH COURT RULES 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 
PART VII. JUDGMENT 
Current with amendments received through 
11-1-98 
RULE 60. RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OR 
ORDER 
(a) Clerical Mistakes. Clerical mistakes in 
judgments, orders or other parts of the record and 
errors therein arising from oversight or omission 
may be corrected by the court at any time of its 
own initiative or on the motion of any party and 
after such notice, if any, as the court orders. 
During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes 
may be so corrected before the appeal is 
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter 
while the appeal is pending may be so corrected 
with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable 
Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud, 
etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, 
the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve 
a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered 
evidence which by due diligence could not have 
been discovered in time to move for a new trial 
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore 
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), 
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an 
adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the 
judgment has been satisfied, released, or 
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or 
it is no longer equitable that the judgment should 
have prospective application; or (6) any other 
reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment. The motion shall be made within a 
reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), 
not more than 3 months after the judgment, 
order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A 
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect 
the finality of a judgment or suspend its 
operation. This rule does not limit the power of 
a court to entertain an independent action to 
relieve a party from a judgment, order or 
proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud 
upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any 
relief from a judgment shall be by motion as 
prescribed in these rules or by an independent 
action. 
[Amended effective April 1, 1998.] 
Advisory Committee Note 
*129 The 1998 amendment eliminates as 
grounds for a motion the following: "(4) when, 
for any cause, the summons in an action has not 
been personally served upon the defendant as 
required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has 
failed to appear in said action." This basis for a 
motion is not found in the federal rule. The 
committee concluded the clause was ambiguous 
and possibly in conflict with rules permitting 
service by means other than personal service. 
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*17 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 8 
WEST'S UTAH COURT RULES 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 
PART III. PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, 
AND ORDERS 
Current with amendments received through 
11-1-98 
RULE 8. GENERAL RULES OF 
PLEADINGS 
(a) Claims for Relief. A pleading which sets 
forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim, 
counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, 
shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of 
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for the 
relief to which he deems himself entitled. Relief 
in the alternative or of several different types 
may be demanded. 
(b) Defenses; Form of Denials. A party shall 
state in short and plain terms his defenses to each 
claim asserted and shall admit or deny the 
averments upon which the adverse party relies. 
If he is without knowledge or information 
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an 
averment, he shall so state and this has the effect 
of a denial. Denials shall fairly meet the 
substance of the averments denied. When a 
pleader intends in good faith to deny only a part 
or a qualification of an averment, he shall specify 
so much of it as is true and material and shall 
deny only the remainder. Unless the pleader 
intends in good faith to controvert all the 
averments of the preceding pleading, he may 
make his denials as specific denials of designated 
averments or paragraphs, or he may generally 
deny all the averments except such designated 
averments or paragraphs as he expressly admits; 
but, when he does so intend to controvert all its 
averments, he may do so by general denial 
subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 11. 
(c) Affirmative Defenses. In pleading to a 
preceding pleading, a party shall set forth 
affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration 
and award, assumption of risk, contributory 
negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, 
estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, 
illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, 
license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of 
frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, and any 
other matter constituting an avoidance or 
affirmative defense. When a party has 
mistakenly designated a defense as a 
counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the 
court on terms, if justice so requires, shall treat 
the pleadings as if there had been a proper 
designation. 
*18 (d) Effect of Failure to Deny. Averments 
in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is 
required, other than those as to the amount of 
damage, are admitted when not denied in the 
responsive pleading. Averments in a pleading to 
which no responsive pleading is required or 
permitted shall be taken as denied or avoided. 
(e) Pleading to Be Concise and Direct; 
Consistency. 
(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be 
simple, concise, and direct. No technical forms 
of pleading or motions are required. 
(2) A party may set forth two or more 
statements of a claim or defense alternately or 
hypothetically, either in one count or defense or 
in separate counts or defenses. When two or 
more statements are made in the alternative and 
one of them if made independently would be 
sufficient, the pleading is not made insufficient 
by the insufficiency of one or more of the 
alternative statements. A party may also state as 
many separate claims or defenses as he has 
regardless of consistency and whether based on 
legal or on equitable grounds or on both. All 
statements shall be made subject to the 
obligations set forth in Rule 11. 
(f) Construction of Pleadings. All pleadings 
shall be so construed as to do substantial justice. 
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* 19740 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 
8 
UNITED STATES CODE 
ANNOTATED 
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED 
STATES DISTRICT COURTS 
III. PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS 
Amendments received to 8-21-98 
Rule 8. General Rules of Pleading 
(a) Claims for Relief. A pleading which sets 
forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim, 
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, 
shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of 
the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction 
depends, unless the court already has jurisdiction 
and the claim needs no new grounds of 
jurisdiction to support it, (2) a short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 
entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment 
for the relief the pleader seeks. Relief in the 
alternative or of several different types may be 
demanded. 
(b) Defenses; Form of Denials. A party shall 
state in short and plain terms the party's defenses 
to each claim asserted and shall admit or deny 
the averments upon which the adverse party 
relies. If a party is without knowledge or 
information sufficient to form a belief as to the 
truth of an averment, the party shall so state and 
this has the effect of a denial. Denials shall fairly 
meet the substance of the averments denied. 
When a pleader intends in good faith to deny 
only a part or a qualification of an averment, the 
pleader shall specify so much of it as is true and 
material and shall deny only the remainder. 
Unless the pleader intends in good faith to 
controvert all the averments of the preceding 
pleading, the pleader may make denials as 
specific denials of designated averments or 
paragraphs or may generally deny all the 
averments except such designated averments or 
paragraphs as the pleader expressly admits; but, 
when the pleader does so intend to controvert all 
its averments, including averments of the 
grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction 
depends, the pleader may do so by general denial 
subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 11. 
(c) Affirmative Defenses. In pleading to a 
preceding pleading, a party shall set forth 
affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration 
and award, assumption of risk, contributory 
negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, 
estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, 
illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, 
license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of 
frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, and any 
other matter constituting an avoidance or 
affirmative defense. When a party has 
mistakenly designated a defense as a 
counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the 
court on terms, if justice so requires, shall treat 
the pleading as if there had been a proper 
designation. 
* 19741 (d) Effect of Failure to Deny. 
Averments in a pleading to which a responsive 
pleading is required, other than those as to the 
amount of damage, are admitted when not denied 
in the responsive pleading. Averments in a 
pleading to which no responsive pleading is 
required or permitted shall be taken as denied or 
avoided. 
(e) Pleading to be Concise and Direct; 
Consistency. 
(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be 
simple, concise, and direct. No technical forms 
of pleading or motions are required. 
(2) A party may set forth two or more 
statements of a claim or defense alternately or 
hypothetically, either in one count or defense or 
in separate counts or defenses. When two or 
more statements are made in the alternative and 
one of them if made independently would be 
sufficient, the pleading is not made insufficient 
by the insufficiency of one or more of the 
alternative statements. A party may also state 
as many separate claims or defenses as the 
party has regardless of consistency and whether 
based on legal, equitable, or maritime grounds. 
All statements shall be made subject to the 
obligations set forth in Rule 11. 
(f) Construction of Pleadings. All pleadings 
shall be so construed as to do substantial justice. 
CREDIT(S) 
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1992 Main Volume 
(As amended Feb. 28, 1966, eff. July 1, 1966; Mar. 2, 
1987, eff. Aug. 1, 1987.) 
<General Materials (GM) - References, 
Annotations, or Tables> 
HISTORICAL NOTES 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTES 
1937 Adoption 
Note to Subdivision (a). See [former] Equity Rules 25 
(Bill of Complaint-Contents), and 30 (Answer-Contents-
Counterclaim). Compare 2 Ind.Stat.Ann. (Burns, 1933) §§ 
2-1004, 2-1015; 2 Ohio Gen.Code Ann. (Page, 1926) §§ 
11305, 11314; Utah Rev.Stat.Ann. (1933) §§ 104-7-2, 
104-9-1. 
See Rule 19(c) for the requirement of a statement in a 
claim for relief of the names of persons who ought to be 
parties and the reason for their omission. 
See Rule 23(b) for particular requirements as to the 
complaint in a secondary action by shareholders. 
Note to Subdivision (b). 1. This rule supersedes the 
methods of pleading prescribed in U.S.C., Title 19, § 508 
(Persons making seizures pleading general issue and 
proving special matter); U.S.C Title 35, [former] §§ 40d 
(Proving under general issue, upon notice, that a statement 
in application for an extended patent is not true), 69 [now 
282] (Pleading and proof in actions for infringement) and 
similar statutes. 
* 19742 2. This rule is, in part, [former] Equity Rule 30 
(Answer—Contents-Counterclaim), with the matter on 
denials largely from the Connecticut practice. See Conn. 
Practice Book (1934) §§ 107, 108, and 122; 
Conn.Gen.Stat. (1930) §§ 5508 to 5514. Compare the 
English practice, English Rules Under the Judicature Act 
(The Annual Practice, 1937) O. 19, r.r. 17-20. 
Note to Subdivision (c). This follows substantially 
English Rules Under the Judicature Act (The Annual 
Practice, 1937) O. 19, r. 15 and N.Y.C.P.A. (1937) § 242, 
with "surprise" omitted in this rule. 
Note to Subdivision (d). The first sentence is similar to 
former Equity Rule 30 (Answer-Contents-Counterclaim). 
For the second sentence see former Equity Rule 31 
(Reply-When Required-When Cause at Issue). This is 
similar to English Rules Under the Judicature Act (The 
Annual Practice, 1937) O. 19, r.r. 13, 18; and to the 
practice of the States. 
Note to Subdivision (e). This rule is an elaboration upon 
[former] Equity Rule 30 (Answer-Contents-
Counterclaim), plus a statement of the actual practice under 
some codes. Compare also [former] Equity Rule 18 
(Pleadings-Technical Forms Abrogated). See Clark, Code 
Pleading (1928), pp. 171-4, 432-5; Hankin, Alternative 
and Hypothetical Pleading (1924), 33 Yale L.J. 365. 
Note to Subdivision (f). A provision of like import is of 
frequent occurrence in the codes. Smith-Hurd 111. Stats, ch. 
110, § 157(3); 2 Minn.Stat. (Mason, 1927) § 9266; 
N.Y.C.P.A. (1937) § 275; 2 N.D.Comp.Laws Ann. (1913) 
§ 7458. 
1966 Amendment 
The change here is consistent with the broad purposes of 
unification. 
1987 Amendment 




Amendment of pleadings generally, see Fed.Rules 
Civ.Proc.Rulel5,28USCA. 
Defenses in law or fact, how presented, see Fed.Rules 
Civ.Proc. Rule 12, 28 USCA. 
Forms, see Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. Form 1 et seq., 28 USCA. 
Joinder of claims, see Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. Rule 18, 28 
USCA. 
Relief granted in judgment even if not demanded, see 
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. Rule 54, 28 USCA. 
* 19743 Reply to counterclaims denominated as such, see 
Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. Rule 7, 28 USCA. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Administrative Law 
Complaint and answer, see Koch, Administrative Law and 
Practice § 8.43 et seq. 
Petition to commence suit, form of, see West's Federal 
Practice Manual § 1896. 
Preparation of complaint, see West's Federal Practice 
Manual § 7955. 
American Digest System 
Federal civil procedure; affirmative defense or avoidance, 
see Federal Civil Procedure <@=>751 et seq. 
Federal civil procedure; answer; failure to deny, see 
Federal Civil Procedure <@=>745. 
Federal civil procedure; answer in general, see Federal 
Civil Procedure <®=>731 et seq. 
Federal civil procedure; complaint in general, see Federal 
Civil Procedure <®==?671 et seq. 
Federal civil procedure; construction of pleadings in 
general, see Federal Civil Procedure <®=>654. 
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Federal civil procedure; simplicity, conciseness, and 
directness of pleadings in general, see Federal Civil 
Procedure <®=:?631 et seq. 
Encyclopedias 
Federal civil procedure; affirmative defense or avoidance, 
see C.J.S. Federal Civil Procedure § 306 et seq. 
Federal civil procedure; answer; admissions; failure to 
deny, see C.J.S. Federal Civil Procedure § 305. 
Federal civil procedure; answer in general, see C.J.S. 
Federal Civil Procedure § 301 et seq. 
Federal civil procedure; complaint in general, see C.J.S. 
Federal Civil Procedure § 262 et seq. 
Federal civil procedure; construction of pleadings; 
conclusiveness, see C.J.S. Federal Civil Procedure § 
258. 
Federal civil procedure; simplicity, conciseness, and 
directness of pleadings in general, see C.J.S. Federal 
Civil Procedure § 254. 
Forms 
Action against U.S., complaints, see West's Federal Forms 
§ 1771 etseq. 
Actions by U.S. to enforce or protect its rights, see West's 
Federal Forms § 1791 et seq. 
Affirmative defenses, see West's Federal Forms § 2060 et 
seq. 
Answers in admiralty claims, see West's Federal Forms § 
10783 etseq. 
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